NOI CEI DIN LINIA INTAI-1985-Hq. (Mai 2024)
La sfârșitul lunii iulie și la începutul lunii august 1914, marile puteri ale Europei au pornit într-un curs de acțiune care ar pretinde milioane de vieți, arunca imperiile, reformulează structura politică a continentului și contribuie la un conflict și mai distructiv o generație mai târziu. Cunoscut la vremea aceea ca Marele Război sau pur și simplu Războiul Mondial, conflictul care se numește astăzi Primul Război Mondial a fost caracterizat de tacticianul și istoricul britanic Sir Basil Liddell Hart în acest fel:
Războiul mondial poate fi scurt pe scurt ca un progres de la convenție, prin haos până la cooperare. Națiunile au intrat în conflict cu perspectivele convenționale și sistemul secolului al XVIII-lea doar modificate de evenimentele din secolul al XIX-lea. Din punct de vedere politic, au conceput-o ca pe o luptă între coaliții rivale bazate pe sistemul tradițional de alianțe diplomatice și militar ca între armate profesionale - umflate, este adevărat, datorită sistemului continental de recrutare, totuși, în mod esențial luptat de soldați în timp ce masa oamenilor a urmărit, de pe scaune în amfiteatru, eforturile campionilor lor.
Liddell Hart, care scria pentru a 13-a ediție a Encyclopædia (1926), a continuat:
Numai germanii aveau o privire asupra adevărului, dar - una sau două minți profetice în afară - teoria „Națiunea în brațe”, evoluată de ei în timpul secolului al XIX-lea, a vizualizat națiunea mai degrabă ca un rezervor pentru a-și turna întăririle în armată decât ca un râu puternic în care sunt contopite multe forțe tributare, dintre care armata nu este decât una. Concepția lor a fost „Națiunea în brațe”, cu greu „Națiunea în război”. Chiar și astăzi acest adevăr fundamental încă a fost înțeles în întregime și implicațiile sale depline înțelese. În mod progresiv, de-a lungul anilor 1914–18, națiunile în război au înscris cercetarea omului de știință, puterile inventive și priceperea tehnică a inginerului, munca manuală a industriei și stiloul propagandistului. Multă vreme, această fuziune a multor forțe a avut tendința de a transforma un haotic în forțe; vechea comandă se dărâmase,noul nu evoluase încă. Numai treptat, a apărut o cooperare de lucru și este un punct important dacă chiar în ultima fază cooperarea forțelor a atins nivelul superior de coordonare - direcția prin unitatea diversității.
As Liddell Hart made clear, the concept of a “Nation in Arms” was not a new one. Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz had advocated a form of total war in his classic work Vom Kriege (1832; On War). Although Clausewitz later modified his position to state that military aims were subordinate to political necessity, the concept was made manifest in the structure of the German military. On the eve of World War I, conscription was an established practice in Germany, and an able-bodied German man was subject to up to three years of full-time military service, followed by more than two decades of progression through numerous tiers of reserve status. At the commencement of hostilities, German land forces numbered almost two million troops, divided among 98 regular divisions as well as 27 Landwehr reserve brigades. Reserve units had traditionally been relegated to noncombat duties, but German reserves were of such high quality that they were utilized as an integral part of the frontline advance. At the core of this sizable conscript force was perhaps the German military’s greatest strength, its career commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
In contrast, the British army could field just 120,000 men in August 1914, but it had benefited from a series of organizational reforms implemented by Secretary of State for War Richard Burdon Haldane. Haldane had restructured the army into an expeditionary force of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division, supplemented by a 14-division Territorial Force that, while committed primarily to the defense of the British Isles, could, at the discretion of the unit’s commander, volunteer for deployment abroad. Haldane also reformed the top levels of command by creating a general staff inspired by the German model. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that embarked for France in August and September 1914 would prove crucial in checking the advance of the German right flank and frustrating the Schlieffen Plan, Helmuth von Moltke’s modification of Count Alfred von Schlieffen’s proposal that Germany strike a rapid, decisive blow with a large force at France’s flank through Belgium, then sweep around and crush the French armies against a smaller German force in the south. But the BEF would achieve that at an enormous cost.
French military planners had grossly miscalculated German strength on the Western Front, most notably failing to account for the combat readiness of German reserves. That failure produced troop estimates that were roughly half their actual levels. Thus, from the Battle of Mons (August 23, 1914) to the First Battle of Ypres (October 12–November 11, 1914), the BEF consistently faced superior numbers but still performed admirably, thanks largely to the remarkable discipline and enviable marksmanship exhibited by its soldiers. However, the attrition that would characterize the war as a whole meant that few of the men and officers of the BEF remained in action by the end of 1914. The burden of service would shift to the Territorial Forces, Lord Horatio Kitchener’s “New Army” divisions, and troops from Britain’s colonies and dominions. By war’s end, almost 9,000,000 men would serve in the British army: more than 4,000,000 came from England, 1,300,000 from India, more than 600,000 from Canada, roughly 560,000 from Scotland, almost 420,000 from Australia, 270,000 from Wales, 136,000 from South Africa, 134,000 from Ireland, 124,000 from New Zealand, 26,000 from British East Africa, approximately 16,000 from Nigeria, an additional 16,000 from Britain’s Caribbean possessions, almost 11,000 from Nyasaland, 10,000 from Gold Coast, and thousands of others from throughout the British Empire. According to official records, 908,371 of those men were killed, and an additional 2,000,000 were wounded.
What, then, was the result of this sacrifice? Liddell Hart, writing in the 1920s, viewed the war’s outcome through a lens that was uncoloured by the later horrors of World War II:
It is
futile to ask which country won the war; France did not win the war, but unless she had held the fort while the forces of Britain were preparing and those of America still a dream the release of civilization from this nightmare of militarism would have been impossible. Britain did not win the war, but without her command of the sea, her financial support and her army to take over the main burden of the struggle from 1916 onwards, defeat would have been inevitable. The United States did not win the war, but without their economic aid to ease the strain, without the arrival of their troops to turn the numerical balance, and, above all, without the moral tonic which their coming gave, victory would have been impossible. And let us not forget how many times Russia had sacrificed herself to save her Allies; preparing the way for their ultimate victory as surely as for her downfall. Finally, whatever be the verdict of history on her policy, unstinted tribute is due to the incomparable endurance and skill with which Germany more than held her own for four years against superior numbers, an epic of military and human achievement.
What follows is a survey of the political and military leaders of World War I, the technology that forever changed the nature of armed conflict, and the battles that claimed the lives of millions. It examines the war’s cultural impact through poetry and the visual language of wartime propaganda. Also included is a timeline of significant events of the war.
